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iγ~tγoduction 
One of the severest critics of Buddhism among the Neo心onfucianphilosophers in 
China's Sung Dynasty was Chang Tsai (1020-1077). His criticisms were the more 
devastating because it was known that he himself had studied Buddhism for a few 
years before rejecting jt for more Confucian views. Although he undoubtedly acquired 
many Buddhist ideas while studying Buddhism， he later “attacked Buddhism so se-
verely that the very root of its teaching was greatly shaken." (1) It is the intent of this 
essay to examine the nature and accuracy of Chang's attacks， as well as the ways in 
which Buddhism influenced， perhaps subconsciously， Chang's own philosophy. 
There were several major Buddhist schools in eleventh century China with which 
Chang might have had contact， including the Ch'an (Zen)， the Amitabha (Pure Land)， 
and remnants of the Hua Yen idealist tradition. These schools had widely diverging 
positions on the nature of reality and life， as wel1 as about the way the present life 
should be conducted. Since it was often common for monasteries to study more than 
one tradition， itmust have been quite confusing for any non-Buddhist trying to sort 
out and synthesize the real meanings of Buddhism from these various traditions. And 
it would be equaIly impossible for this study to treat each of the tradiations which 
Chang Tsai might have studied as independent philosophies. 
Chang Tsai must have studied numerous Buddhist scriptures during the period of 
his interest in Buddhism， but it appears that the famous Lαnkαvatαγα，or Leng Yen Sutra， 
was the focal point of most of his attacks， (2)and represented the mode of Buddhism 
which Chang studied reasonably well. Therefore， to more realistically confine the scope 
of this present inquiry， Chang's understanding and criticisms of the Lαnkavat，αγαwill be 
taken as representative of his approach to Chinese Buddhism of his day. 
Several methodological dangers are inherent in this procedure. First of al， many of 
Chang's most vicious attacks are more probably directed against the contemporaneous 
practices of Buddhists who had strayed far from the doctrines spelled out in the 
Lαnkαuαtaγα. Secondly， ifsome of the sources of Chang's criticisms are actually psy-
chological as well as philosophical， based on an ethnocentrism against the originaIIy-
Indian Buddhism， (3) this purely philosophical comparison may necessarily be in-
adequate. Finally， Chang's attacks against the a-political nature of Buddhism cannot 
possibly be countered in this approach， for the Lankavatara (as indeed the vast bulk of 
Buddhist literature) simply does not concern itself with questions of government or the 
ideal society-which were major concerns to the Neo-Confucian Chinese! 
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This study， then， wjll concentrate on understanding Chang's ethical and metaeth-
ical criticisms of the Lαnlwvatara. But this inquirγwill attempt to avoid defense of 
Buddhism as a philosophy， and it grants from the outset that there are many areas of 
importance to philosophical thought which are simply not discussed by Buddhism. 
Therefor凋eit will confine itself primarily to those areas which are discussed by both 
Buddhism and Chang Tsai. Since the Lankavata1iαis a rather unorganized document， (tl)
" (5) and since Chang's philosophy is a1so somewhat “in a fluid state， lacking consistency， 
some other basis for organization must be adopted. Chang's most strenous critlclsms 
ar・eagainst the Buddhists' lack of ethical coηcerη， so it is perhaps this area which 
should be examined first. 
???????????
Ethics of Enlightened Love 
One serious criticism of the Buddhist ethical stand was that the Buddhists were 
escapist， and denied social obligations. (6) There appears to be a long historical basis for 
such a claim as well， for even the Buddha himself rejected the kingly political position 
which cou1d have awaited him in lndia， to become a wandering monk and ascetic in 
search of enlightenment. This rejection of worldly obligation in pursuit of spiritual 
insight and enlightenment was firmly grounded in and acceptable to Indian society and 
wor1d-views， but diametrically antithetical to the politically-conscious ethical philo-
sophies throughout China's long history. The history of Buddhism in China shows 
monkish， a-socia1 developments ever encroaching on the societal concerns and respon-
sibilities of the inteIligentsia， until at last the too時transcendentaltendencies would be 
periodically and forcibly suppressed. Clearly， Buddhist philosophy did place much 
greater emphasis upon personal and spiritual culture than upon social policy. 
However， Chang、attackcould be slightly softened by two observations. First of 
al1， there is an important distinction (even today) between that smaIl elite of monastic 
Buddhists who are working towards spiritual advancement， and the vast majority of 
lay Buddhists who live fairly normallives and abide by much more conventional moral 
standards. Since Chang studied in a monastery， itis undoubtedly the monks he studied 
under， and not the total Buddhist society， who deserve his censure for lack of political 
interest. Admittedly， the more influentiaI the monasteries were， the more prominent 
this attitude might becom'e， and the more justified this criticIsm would be to Buddhist 
society as a whole. 
The second important distinction must be made between the practice of particular 
Buddhists with whom Chang may have been acquainted， and the actual ethical teach-
ings of the Lankavatara. Chang's indictment reads:“…human relations have not been 
observed， things have not been understood， government has been neglected， morality 
has been in chaos， and heterodox doctrines have filled the ears." (7) It has already been 
confessed that Buddhism does not adequately deal with issues of human relations and 
government. But in the areas of morality and doctrine， the Lankαvαtara is explicit: 
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"One should cherish the ideas of charity， good behavior， patience， zeal， thoughtful-
ness， and wisdom...Charity calls for the more costly gifts of sympathy and understand-
ing…(prajnα， or wisdom) will reveal itself in its true perfectness of all-inclusive Truth 
which is Love." (8) 
Thus the Lαnkavatαγαdoes have an ethical side， even if it is often overshadowed by 
metaphysical implications or discussions. 
However， even the metaphysical discussions of the Lαnたαvatarahave an implicitly 
ethical direction， al too often overlooked by its readers. D. T. Suzuki suggested that the 
raison d'etre of the Lan}，ωvatar，αis its social and moral side: its numerous doctrines 
point to practices of selfless love for al beings. The emphasis on the practical and social 
side of life is precisely what distinguishes Ch'an Mahayana from Hinayana doctrines. 
Any philosophizing that a Ch'anist engages is supposedly "really to qualify oneself for 
social work". (9) This distinctively Chinese element in Ch'an Buddhism is one of the 
major reasons that Ch'an survived the persecutions of other， less practically-oriented， 
Buddhist sects in tenth century China. Thus， the ethical impulses in Ch'an Buddhism 
are a definitely Chinese contribution to an lndian philosophy which underemphasized 
this s.ort of concern. 
Even after Ch'an had been ethically reinforced by strong social impulses from the 
Chinese tradition， there remained an element of detachment or other-worldliness in the 
motives of its ethics. For the Buddhist， ethical actions were to be performed with as 
litle effort and self-consciousness as possible， to generate the least possible karmic 
influences. For Chang Tsai and other Neo-Confucians， however， ethical actions are to be 
deliberately cultivated， educated， and consciously practiced. They are not Buddhist 
stepping-stones or results of a transcendental consciousness for Chang， but rather a 
definite， this-wordly effort to improve human relations and harmony on earth. 
Chang Tsai writes repeatedly of sincerity as the essential virtue. He describes the 
great man as practicing sincerity resulting from enlightenment， thus: (10) 
“The great man is able to know and to practice its principle to the utmost. 
Therefore， when he establishes himself， he will help others to establish themselves. 
He will share his knowledge with all. He will love universally." 
This theme of universal love pervades Chang's philosophy， and leads one to recall 
the similar-sounding doctrines of Mo-Tsu. In fact， the connection of universallove with 
the sage's establishment in knowledge， and with his desire to share his wisdom with aU， 
is a distincly Mahayana concept. Carsun Chang expressly indicates that the cosmic 
significance and breadth which the concept of jen finds in Chang's universal live is a 
direct result of strong Buddhist influence. (11) Chang's thoughts are paraphrased by the 
words of Buddha to his disciple， found in the Lanたαvatar，α.(12) 
“Thus， Mahamati， wherever there is the evolution of living beings， let people 
cherish the kinship of them." 
And Chang somewhat similarly states: 
“AIl men are my brothers， and a1 things are my companions." (13) 
。
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But there is an important， ifsu btle difference， between the sutra's and Chang's 
meaning in these passages. Notice that theLankavatara thinks of kinship with allliving 
beings， harkening back to the Indian concept of eternal reincarnations on different 
levels of existence. The Buddhist notion would suggest that man is distantly related to 
a1 beings because a1 in some sense either were， or might stil become， human， in the 
course of innumerable ages. The Chinese approach needs none of this metaphysics. 
Chang's concern is clearly towards man， as man， and he dr出馬TSthe line between man 
and things， not between living beings and objects. After al， man is the only creature 
who has the capability of being ethical and the true responsibility of governing his own 
societies. 
What this similarity does demonstrate is that， to the extent that Chang Tsai adopts 
the concept of universal love， itis more likely that he developed it from the Buddhist 
framework than from the ancient ideas of Mo・Tsu，or as a completely independent and 
personal pronouncement. This is not to say that the ethic of universal love is the only 
one in Chang's system， however. Although this may be held up as an ideal， stil his 
famous western inscription acknowledges the importance of gradations of love， and 
particularly stresses the importance of filial piety， a virtue largely overlooked by 
Buddhist writers， including the Lankavataアα.
lndeed， there is no good analogue in the Buddhist tradition to this most precious of 
Chinese virtues， and the Buddha himself exemplified this fact by disobeying his own 
parents and completely breaking his ties with his whole family. It is only in the more 
distant and universal applications of ethics that Chang主saiand the Lankαvαtara could 
approach agreement. On the most fundamental and literally“close to home" level， 
Buddhism sees filial piety as engendering a dangerous self-attachment to home and 
people， and Chang Tsai sees Buddhism as ignoring the most essential of ethical 
requirements. However， a few further similarities between their systems could be 
located in a paraHel role of Sage and Bodhisattva. 
TheLanたαvαtarafrequently comments that its purpose is“for the welfare of many 
people... compassion for the world， for the benefit of the suffering multitudes..." Chang 
Tsai could agree with these concerns， particularly ih view of his own discussion of 
mercy to orphans， help to the helpless， care for the aged and weak as the duty of the 
Sage. In the Lankavatαra， every man is considered a potential Bodhisattva who must 
first establish himself in enlightenment by study of reality. Analogously， Chang Tsai 
holds that anyone caロbecomea Sage by a study of principle and the enlightenment of 
sincerity. 1n his explanatory preface to the Lαnkavat，αra， Suzuki succincly summarizes: 
“…the essence of Bodhisattvahood is an unequivucal affirmation of the social， altruistic 
nature of humankind. Whatever enlightenment one gains， itmust be shared by one's 
fellow-being." (14) 
Chang's ethical philosophy also postulates the social nature and altruistic imperative of 
mankind， and Chang's Sage naturally wishes to share his wisdom and express universal 
love to al his fellow beings. 
九
In wording， therefore， Chang Tsai could almost be taken as repeating Buddhist 
ethical theory. But the practice and assumptions of these two ethics are on quite 
different grounds， which should fairly be distinguished. For Chang， al men can-
indeed are mora11y compe11ed to-act in a moral fashion even on the way to Sagehood， 
whether they ever achieve it or not. For the Buddhist， man's major effort should be a 
spiritual cultivation preparatory to enlightenment， and only after enlightenment wi11 
the Bodhisattvas' actions be truly moral. Chang assumes that the Sage wi11 want to 
share his wisdom for the betterment of the human condition and political situation here 
in this life， whereas the Buddhist， by contrast， thinks of the enlightened Bodhisattva as 
a deliverer leading a1 beings away from this realm of suffering existence， into a state 
of Nirvana where human relations are no longer even applicable. Thus the assumptions 
behind these theories of enlightened love are contrary. 
Ethics of NoγレAttαchment
Having compared the similarities and differences between Buddhist and Chang's 
concepts of universal love， we might turn to a second major ethical concern: the ethic 
of non-attachment. The doctrine of non-attachment， in one form or another， isone of 
the most fundamental ethics of al1 Buddhism， stemming from the revelation of the 
Buddha himself. 
According to the Lankαvαtara， greed， anger， and fo11y are the major vices which 
must be overcome if one would avoid ruin. It can easily be shown that each of these 
vices stems from a selfish or materialistic motive. The Sagathakam， a poetic version of 
the Lαnkavatara， suggests that the man seeking to become a sage must not keep 
"money， grain， gold， lands， goods， kine and sheep， slaves， horses， elephants，" or other 
trappings of wealth. He is enjoined to avoid the court circles and the company of men 
of rank， lest he be spoiled by them and come to think that their esteem is essential. He 
is repeatedly advised to curb his sensual desires， and not to imagine that valueless 
things are valuable. Thus， the Lankavat，αγαadvises the avoidance of greed by the 
cultivation of a non-attachment towards wealth， fame， and real or imagined sensual 
pleasures. (15) 
Chang Tsai's view is quite in accord with this Buddhist theory， although it may 
derive from Confucian rather than Buddhist influences.“Chang Tsai's theory rendered 
a great service to the art of personal cultivation. He stressed that to improve one's self 
is to change one's physical nature. Doing away with desires， contro11ing one's imagina-
tion， suppressing the search for fame and money， are methods." (16) Clearly， itis not this 
aspect of the ethics of Buddhism which was repugnant to Chang Tsai， or he would not 
have accepted it so fully into his own system as well. However， Chang would warn 
against letting this doctrine of non-attachment separate one from society altogether. 
And his idea that the physical nature is what needs changing is also a variation on the 
theme， which wi11 be more fu日ydeveloped at a later point. 
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Anger， or emotional strain， isthe second attitude which the Lankavatara criticizes 
as unethical and unworthy of the moral man. One who wills， and strives for personal 
ends or with ulterior mobves， may easily become angered if he cannot achieve the ends 
he desIres. The good Buddhist disciple， who has perfected a compassionate heart and an 
attitute of detachment， will disavow al1 self-oriented motives， and no disappointment 
will 1'ouse him to ange1'. Suzuki elaborates on this idea as follows: 
"The doctrine of effortless or purposeless deeds (αnabhogacαγyα) is rooted in.. the 
pitying hea1't that transcends the cold and seve1'e contemplation of the reasoning 
philosopher. The Compassionate heart hasηo ulterior motive except that it moves 
spontaneously…out of its ove1'flowing goodness." (17) 
Chang a1so app1ies this ideal of effo1'tless impe1'turbability to his philosophe1'-sage， 
of w hom he writes:“To be sincere 01' grave without effort may be said of the superior 
man ¥νho... does not resoft to ange1' and the people are a wed." (18) Thus Chang's ethics 
share with the Lαnkαvat，αra the conviction that the good man need never lose his 
temper， but can maintain an effortless gravity and impressive calm in a1 situations. 
A voidance of folly is the third aspect of Buddhist non駒attachment.For the Ch'anist， 
fol1y consists in the belief that material objects are important 01' real， which belief 
might lead one to follow pleasant sensations instead of the more austere path of 
wisdom. The poetic Sagαthakam says that only the unintelligent imagine that me10-
dious sounds reside inside the lute or conch町shell;only the unenlightened seek the sight 
of precious stones in streams or underground. (19) Only by leaving the material desires 
and impressions for the true dha1'ma is there purification f1'om passions. This is perhaps 
the most fundamental tenet of a1 Chinese Buddhism. 
Chang does not directly criticize this ethic either. He proposes: 
"The mind of ordina1'Y people is limited to what is seen and what is heard. The sage， 
however， ful1y develops his nature and does not allow what is seen or heard to fetter 
his mind." (20) 
Although Chang has quite different ontological convictions， he accepts the Bud-
dhist moral maxims of non-attachment in al of their three facets: the avoidance of 
greed， of anger or passion， of the folly of mate1'ial fetters. At least in these respects， close 
examination shows that the Ch'anists whom Chang attacked so fie1'cely for their "mo1'al 
chaos" did have a structured moral platform fundamental to thei1' religious com-
mitment， and one which Chang himself could basically agree with. However， Chang 
would never extend the doctrine of non-attachment to refer to people， and he would feel 
that an ethic which failed to include filia1 piety and fami1y relations was sadly lacking. 
1n sum， Chang Tsai could accept the ethics of the Lαnkavatara， and adopted some 
of them into his own system. But he repudiated their strong emphasis on self-culture 
and urged the importance of more realistic， socially ext1'overted elements in his own， 
more comprehensive， system. 
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Metα-Ethicαl Assumptionsαnd Groundwork 
The foregoing analysis should make clear that Chang Tsai's criticisms of Buddhist 
morality were directed at several particular flaws in the Buddhist system: First， the 
failure of Buddhism to adequately deal with political and societal issues， leading also to 
monastic scholasticism; second， the failure of Buddhism to require familial and parental 
loyalties; thirdly， the essential differences in assumptions which underlay the apparent 
parallels between Chang's system and the ethical system of the Lαnたαvαtara.It is to 
these assumptions that this section will particularly turn. 
Both Ch'an Buddhism and Chang Tsai tend to be quite optimistic about man's 
essential goodness， which comes to full view in the Bodhisattva or sage. Since sagehood 
can only be achieved through the practice of universal love (among other things) both 
philosophies assert that universal love actually can be practiced. This also seems to 
assume that al men are essentially good. Then what has produced this present state in 
which evil men abound and moral injunctions are required? The Sagathakam proposes 
that it is the combination of man's pure nature with the defilements of the external 
world which cause wickedness. A representative quotation proclaims: 
“The ego (primarily) pure has been defiled， on account of the external passions， 
since the beginningless past， and what has been added from outside is like a soiled 
garment to be washed off." (21) 
1n more classical Sanskritic terminology， the sutra elsewhere explains: 
"The CiUa in its essence is thoroughly pure， the Manas is defiled，" (i. e.， the mind in 
its essence is thoroughly pure， but that part of consciousness embedded in and 
concerned with physical matter is impure.) (22) 
Chang's theory is somewhat similar. He also holds that there are two aspects of 
existence; a pure and unspoiled “Principle of Heaven" and a lower， material impulse 
involving human desires. One of his clearer statements on this issue reads: 
"Nature in man is always good. It depends on whether man can skilfully return to 
it or not. To exceed the transforming operation of Heaven and Earth (as in sex and food) 
means not to return to it.." (23) 
This citation is clearly in accord with the Lαnkavat，αγαconcept， ifnot adapted from it， 
and at least provides litle ground for criticism of the Buddhist stance. Buddhism and 
Chang Tsai in some sense agree that man's physical involvement contaminates his pure 
and inherently good spiritual or“heavenly" nature. Chang， however， would contend 
that matter in itself is not evil， nor does it require an escape from this world; rather it
is the differentiation and false valuing of matter which originate evil. 
Chang's CI札icismsbegin to have telling relevance when applied to the Buddhist 
rationales for non-attachment. Chang accuses the Buddhist theory of transmigration as 
entailing suffering， and as postulating a soul for which there is no evidence. Both of 
these objections illustrate Derk Bodde's point that “the Chinese failed to comprehend 
the deep meaning of Buddhism." (24) 
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First of al， the Buddhist theory is not that transmigration causes suffering， but 
rather that life itself is suffering， and transmigration merely adds that man cannot 
escape his djlemmas by death or suicide. Secondly， the Buddhists repeatedly emphasize 
that transmigration does not necessitate a soul; this doctrine of anatman was one of the 
basic elements in Buddha's enlightenment. Although often misinterpreted， itis not that 
difficult to comprehend: man's life and self is like a wave which passes through 
different waters or a f1ame which passes from match to match， but never has an 
independent entity or conscious substance apart from the process of life itself. Long 
before Chang's time， the Lαnkαvatara had encountered this kind of confusion from 
other critics， so that long sections of the sutra are dedicated to clarifying that no soul 
or spirit transmigrates， according to Buddhism. One passage which Chang must have 
read confronts this objection directly: 
“If a destroyer (critic) should come around and say，“If there is aηego， show it to 
me!" a sage would declare，“Show me your own discrimination!" (25) 
1n Buddhism， what transmigrates is pure process and function (like the wave or 
flame)， and the karmic influences which a man's life has generated， not a soul， in-
dividual spirit， or personal identity in any form. This doctrine admittedly causes other 
philosophical problems for the Buddhists， but at least it exempts them from the brunt 
of Chang Tsai's misplaced criticism， which apply more appropriately to Hindu versions 
of reincarnation 
Chang also tended to criticize the doctrine of karma， because it seemed to entail a 
transmigrational theory. (26) However， these two concepts are entirely and logically 
independent of each other， although associated in Indian thought. Karma asserts that 
al man's actions produce effects which (in Buddhist theory) are preserved in the 
modifications of the universe which they effect. Karma also asserts the ultimate view 
that there is a kind of justice in the universe which ultimately wil1 provide each man 
with his deserts. Chang Tsai， without realizing that he is paraphrasing this conviction 
of the karma theory， himself agreed: 
“If one is upright in his life and follows principle， then a1 his good and evil fortunes 
are correct. If one is not upright in his life， either he enjoys blessings that are evil， or he 
shirks from danger." (27) 
This idea that man's fortunes wi1l be appropriate to his character， or that he will be in 
danger if his fortunes exceed what he deserves， isvery close to what the theory of 
karma advocates also. Chang Tsai attacked the theory of karma because he associated 
it with the theory of transmigration， and he attacked the theory of transmigration 
because he thought it entailed the notion of individual souls for which there was no 
empir唱icalevidence. He was mistaken in both of these connections， but on his behalf， it
should be added that this was a mistake of many Chinese who associated Buddhism 
with other Indian theories which were falsely attached to it. 
At any rate， itis quite evident that Chang Tsai disliked certain theories of 
transmigration and karma which he attributed to the Buddhists. Either he seriously. 
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misunderstood the Lankavαtαra teachings， or he was actua11y ignorant of them， which 
seems improbable， or he distorted them for his own polemical purposes. These criti司
cisms represent an anti-metaphysical， or at least an anti-spiritual tendency which has 
already been noted， and which was felt by many Chinese towards Indian spiritualisms. 
In any event， the fact that Chang Tsai's criticisms were so effective in diminishing 
Ch'an Buddhist influences in Sung China is a good indication that his readers suffered 
from some of the same misinterpretations or ignorance of true Buddhist doctrines that 
Chang did. 
The Buddhist Doctγine of Illusion 
Chang Tsai may have been critical of the Buddhists in his discussions of ethics， but 
he allowed within his own ethical systema11 of the major elements of the Lankavαtara包
ethical scheme. Even in his criticisms of the underlying-and more foreign-assump-
tions of Buddhist morality， Chang's outward statements were much harsher than the 
actual differences between his beliefs and theirs. It is in the areas of epistemology and 
ontology that the greatest disparities emerge， which cannot be asily reconciled. Chang 
Tsai's postulation of a vital or material force (ch'i) appeared to be a direct assault on the 
long-standing Buddhist idealism. Typical of his disparagements is this exposition: 
“The Buddhists think... that the production and annihi1ation of the universe are due 
to the elements of existence (dharmas) created by the mind. They regard the small 
(human consciousness) as the cause of the great (reality)， and the secondary as the cause 
of the fundamental." (28) 
Here， Chang Tsai is accusing the Buddhists of a subjective ontology， inwhich the 
human mind is the cause of al reality. The Buddhists， however， were subjective only 
in their epistemology， not their ontology. Thus the Lαnkavatara directly refutes 
Chang's criticisms， for it propounds an objective idealism as its ontology， as Buddha 
tells his disciple: 
“What is meant by an eternally abiding reality? The ancient road of reality， 
Mahamati， has been here a1 the time， like gold， silver， or pearl preserved in the mine... 
and so does the reason of al things; reality forever abides， rea1ity forever keeps its 
order， like the roads in an ancient city. For instance， Mahamati， a man who iswalking 
in a forest and discovering a city with its orderly streets may enter into the city and... 
conduct himself like a citizen... Did this man make the road along which he enters into 四
the city， and also the various things in the city? (No， Blessed One.)" (29) 
With a1 due apologies for the length of these citations， they have been employed 
because they make absolutely explicit the Buddhist argument for objective ontology. 
External objects and their reasoηs abide forever independent of their observer， who 
may or may not experience them， but clearly does not create them. (There also appears 
to be some analogy in this passage between the Buddhist “reason for al things" 
(dhar初 αta)and the N印刷Confucian“principleof things" (li) which Chang repeatedly 
insists should be studied by the Buddhists.) 1n a passage of his own， however， Chang 
asserts the subjective aspect of epistemology which is very close to the intention of the 
Ch'an・ists:
"There is the principle of assisting Heaven in its task of production and bringing 
things to perfection. That depends on me... The relation between the mouth and 
stomach on the oneれand，and food on the other， between the nose and tongue on the 
oロehand and smell and taste on the other， are al cases of nature's attacking and 
内"(30) selZ1WZ 
1n his recognition that the relation between object and perceiver， between sense-
data and what is sensed "depends on me" the perceiver， Chang is at least partially 
accepting the subjective element in the Lankavatara， which he misinterprets and 
attacks. 1n fact， the Lankavαntara makes quite clear that an eternal and absolute Mind， 
above and beyond man， forever exists， and man's perceptions merely discriminate， for 
better or worse， that reality which supersedes him: 
"According to the Buddha， there is nothing in this v'iOrld but l¥I1ind itse1f， and al 
that is of duality has its rise from l¥I1ind， and is seen as perceived and perceiving." (31) 
Suzuki treats this conception of Mind very thoroughly in his introduction to the 
Lankαvatara. He stresses that Alayαand Cit，α， the terms Ch'anists use for Mind， must be 
carefully distinguished in their absolute and more relative usages. 1t is on1y the relative， 
ever-evolving aspect of Alayαwhich “1ends itself to the treacherous interpretation of 
the Mα11αs" (sense center in the consciousness of man). (32) It seems quite likely that 
Chang Tsai simply failed to understand this Sanskritic distinction when studying the 
Lankαvatar，α. The clear intent of the Lanfiωvat，αγαis that man falsely discriminates the 
pre-existing reality with his relative mind， and in kindred vein， Chang writes，“the mind 
commands man's nature and feelings." (33) It is more in this epistemological and psy-
chological respect that he Lαnkαvαtar，αsees the role of subjective mind， so its dif-
ference with Chang is much smaller than his criticism purported. 
With this confusion between ontological and epistemological subjectivism already 
well in mind， itis not too surprising to find that Cha口gTsai a1so somewhat mis鞠
understands the Buddhist doctrine of illusion. Chang denounces the Buddhist proposト
tion "that a1 things as perceived are unreal and end in nothingness..." (34) However， the 
Buddhist doctrine that the world is illusion is not equitable with a nihilism or negativ-
ism either ethically or epistemologically. (Ethically， ithas already been shown how the 
concept of matter as illusion contributes to the important principle of non引 tachment.)
Epistemologically， illusionism follows a middle path between nihilism and eternalism， 
as the Lanたαvataratakes great pains to explain. (35) Dr. Suzuki cites the same mis-
understanding of the Lαnkavαtara which Chang Tsai shared with other readers: 
"AIl these realities， so called， haveロoobjective validity; and therefore， the world is 
altogether empty， void， unreal， and a mass of nothingness. [This seems to be Chang's 
objection.] To think this way， however， isnot the way of the l¥I1ahayanist…The world 
is like maya， and has no ultimate reality， but at the same time they (wise men) know 
???????????
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that it is there， that it is not pure nothingness... An external， particularized world is an 
illusion as long as the ignorant are unable to break through the fetters of vikαlpα， wrong 
discrimination; whereas for the wise， the phenomenal world is true in its suchness 
(tωhαta). (36) 
The doctrine of illusion is propounded in order to break the fetters of wrong 
discrimination and self-attachment， but the enlightened one knows that the exper允ηce
is nonetheless irrevocably given， although it may be something ultimately very dif誹
ferent from its appearance. 
Chang might be tempted to quarrel，“What， then， isthe status of the material 
world? Is it real or not?" The answer of the Lankαvat，αァαwouldbe that Chang is trying 
to oversimplify matter by calling it either real or unreal， and oversimplify reality by 
calling it either material or immaterial. The truth， according to the Lankαvαtαra， isthat 
rea1ity has aspects of both material impression and idea1 Mind， and that the status of 
the material world is that it possesses both a certain mode of reality and a certain mode 
of deceptive il1usion. This qualified admission of the va1ue of the world is a distinguish-
ing characteristic of Ch'an. Unlike earlier Hinayana and Mahayana (Madhyamika) 
nihilisms: 
"According to Buddhist (Lankavatara) phi10sophy， rea1ity must be grasped in this 
world and by this world， for it is that “Beyond Which is also Within." The Lanka 
compares it to the moon in water or a flower in a mirror. It is within and yet outside， it
is outside and yet within. This aspect of rea1ity is described as unobtainable (αηupa-
labdha)." (37) 
This theory expresses the epistemological recognition that we cannot know any 
underlying ontos directly， but only through the medium of our senses. Chang Tsai's 
naive realist stance appears at first glance to overlook or oversimplify these sophis鴫
ticated and important analyses. His attack that“those who take the human wor1d as 
dream and illusion show their inability to investigate its origin，" would be partially 
admitted by Ch'an Buddhists. (38) (They might respond that Chang's own postulation of 
ch 'iwas equally incapab1e of investigation except on subjective， sensory grounds.) At 
the same time， Chang is criticizing not only the Buddhist metaphysics as he under-
stands it， but a1so the who1e tendency of Buddhism to become more involved with 
metaphysical arguments than wor1dly affairs. If this be taken as the force of his 
argument， rather than the particu1ar epistemological issue in question， then his objec-
tion certainly cannot be easily answered. 
A final example of Chang's misunderstanding of Buddhist metaphysics comes in 
his criticism of the paradox of physical dimension. 
“On the grandiose side， they (Ch'anists) err in equating a particle of dust or mustard 
seed with al within the six directions." (39) 
Taken at face value， particularly by a layman ignorant of philosophy， such a scathing 
criticism makes Buddhism sound pretty ridiculous. But this is only because it omits the 
context and intent of such statements. This Buddhist pronouncement is really merely 
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a recognition of the relativity of al1 perceptions and physical objects， which wil1 
presumably be overcome in enlightenment. 1n fact， Chang himself shares this con-
viction almost verbatim in a sentence which would sound equally bizarre if quoted out 
of cOntext to a layman， but with equally sound philosophic sense: 
“What 1 calL.enlightenment is a condition in which there is no perceptible 
distinction between the small and the great. such is the genuine knowledge; it is not 
the petty knowledge of seeing and hearing." (40) Elsewhere Chang says， "As far as the 
expanse of heaven and earth， there is our body，" (41) or "what fils heaven and earth is 
my body." (42)一-thesenotions would sound equally absurd as those he criticizes， iftorn 
from their philosophic contexts. Chang is certainly not claiming that his body is infinite 
in size， but rather that the same essence or substance of which his body and al1 nature 
are made comprises a1l space. And this is precisely what the Lankavatara is saying 
about the mustard seed: that in essence， its substance and reality are the same as the 
substance and reality of the whole material universe. Thus Chang's attack appears 
slightly illegitimate， based either on a genuine failure to comprehend the Buddhist 
teaching， or else (more likely， in view of his own parallel statements) on an under-
handed pulling of an idea from its context. 
ldeαlist vs.五;f，αteriαListOntology 
The only large and unbridgeable gap between Chang Tsai and the Lanたαvatara
Sutra appears to be in the domain of ontology， where the idealistjmaterialist debate has 
been waged for millenia without resolution. Chang's materialistic substance ch'i would 
appear improvable to Buddhists， and the Lαnたαvataγαdoctrineof illusion seems un-
necessarily skeptical to the realist Chang. These differences have been very thoroughly 
examined in an excellent essay on“Chang Tsai's Concept of Ch 'i，" by Dr. Siu-chi Huang， 
therefore this already-long essay wilI not further repeat them 
Even without examining the particulars of these doctrines， we may at least 
examine the Buddhists' susceptibility to Chang Tsai's accusation that they did not 
attempt to investigate ch 'i or li. (43) Here the problem is more a confusion of names than 
a disagreement of fact; and some Confucian rectification is probably in order. The 
Buddhists disagreed with Chang about the basic composition of material elements， but 
they had investigated facts and principles long before his time. Traditional Sanskritic 
vocabulary might substitute the terms vrttis and dharmata-or numerous others-for 
ch'i and li. But in any vocabulary， the relation of material fact and principle was a 
definite concerηof al Buddhists. Before the Ch'an school had reached its apex， Hua 
Yen Buddhists were already demanding: 
“Principle shows itself in many characteristics. If we analyze their power and 
function， the meaning of their expansion and contraction can easily be seen， and only 
when we examine their profound principles can the two fold division of principle (li) 
and fact (ch 'i) be understood..." (44) 
This Buddhist admonition wou1d sound very much like Chang Tsai's own words 
four hundred years later， when ironically， Chang would criticize his opponents for 
lacking that very study which he had inherited from them. His real objection should be 
worded more in terms of a disagreement as to the nature of those li and ch 'i， and not of 
failure to investigate them. 
Chang's debate with Buddhism on this score remains unresolved. lt seems to this 
author that any ontological claim to materialism， like Chang's， must eventuaIly admit 
certain elements of a non-physical nature， such as moral imperatives. Converse1y， any 
subjective or objective idea1ism will ultimately have to admit certain qualified realisms 
-or at 1east their appearances-to the external wor1d. 1n this one area where Chang 
and the Buddhists originally appear so ontologically opposite， their more thorough 
elaborations lead to increasingly similar dualistic tendencies. But this is stretching the 
purview-and perhaps the objectivity-of this study. 
CoγzclusioγlS 
1n overview， Chang's criticisms of Buddhist epistemology were based euher on 
repeated misunderstandings or on other motives for distortion. lt is somewhat surpris-
ing to find a reputable philosopher like Chang Tsai attacking so vicious1y a scho01 to 
which he himself had owed some ideas. The severity of his attacks would tend to 
highlight at least three possible conclusions. First， Chang Tsai strongly objected to the 
emphasis upon mental and spiritual growth in the Buddhist tradition， atthe expense of 
political and agrarian concerns which undoubtedly seemed pressing in his con-
temporary China. Secondly， he may have had emotionally negative reactions to Bud-
dhism， either personally towards his former Buddhist acquaintances， or philosophically 
towards a soteriology very alien to the Chinese mind. Thirdly， the practices of Ch'an 
Buddhists in the eleventh century must have strayed far from the non-attached and 
compassionate ethic dictated by the Lankαvαtara， in which case Chang's criticisms can 
be seen to apply quite validly to the practice， ifnot a1ways to the theories， of Ch'an. As 
is so frequently the case in philosophica1 history， practices of a previous sect fal1 under 
the attacks of new conceptualizers， whose systems may in turn fal1 into the distortions 
of human interpretations through history. But fuIler vindication of these hypotheses 
must await further historical and psycho-biographical research. 
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